I think many of you have heard of the recent news about Hungarian elections - where authoritarian Orban was decisively defeated by Magyar - big plus for EU, even if he’s not a federalist himself, it’s a win for EU, and very likely an end to that constant vetoing of EU decisions. Orban’s vetoing reignited the question of EU integrating further and letting go of vetoes. This isn’t about any one leader, but about whether unanimity rules are still viable in a union of 27+ states.
Trump presidency’s shown to Europe that it cannot rely on USA endlessly. USA is now not only an unreliable partner, but increasingly acting like a hostile nation. A fragmented EU may play well into Russian and American cards, but not for Europeans. This furthers the question of European federalization, the need for common foreign policy and army. Recent events raise uncomfortable questions about whether the EU’s current structure is still fit for the geopolitical environment we’re entering.
I wonder how you view this, the push towards federalization (even if in tiers) and more unity, let’s take a vote and have a discussion.
- Yes (EU citizen)
- A very cautious Yes (EU citizen)
- No (EU citizen)
- I’m fine with either (EU citizen)
- Yes (non-EU citizen)
- A very cautious Yes (non-EU citizen)
- No (non-EU citizen)
- I don’t care, just show results
How it might work
General outline
Below is a plausible, non-utopian, step-by-step scenario for gradual EU federalization, built around political reality rather than ideal theory. This is roughly how it could happen if driven by pressure, incentives, and asymmetric participation rather than grand constitutional moments.
1. The Core Driver: Federalization by Necessity, Not Ideology
The European Union does not federalize because people suddenly become federalists.
It federalizes because certain functions stop working otherwise.
The main pressure points:
- Security & defense (Russia, instability, US unreliability)
- Industrial & energy policy (competition with US/China)
- Foreign policy credibility
- Repeated veto paralysis
This creates a logic of functional consolidation:
“If we want X outcome, we need Y authority — even if we don’t love it.”
2. The Tiered Architecture (Concentric Circles Model)
Tier 1: The Federal Core (≈ 8–12 states initially)
Who joins
- States already aligned on:
- rule of law
- defense outlook
- fiscal discipline
- foreign policy direction
(e.g. France, Germany, Benelux, Nordics, possibly Italy, Spain, Baltics, later others)
Competencies pooled
- Defense & military procurement
- Foreign policy representation
- Sanctions & security decisions
- Strategic industries (energy, semiconductors, defense)
- Partial fiscal capacity (joint borrowing, defense budget)
Decision-making
- No vetoes
- Qualified majority or supermajority
- Stronger executive coordination
Key political trick
This is not called a “federal state”.
It’s framed as a Defense and Strategic Union inside the EU treaties (via enhanced cooperation).
Tier 2: The Integrated Union (Most EU states)
What they keep
- Single market
- Free movement
- Trade policy
- Climate and regulatory alignment
- Structural funds access
What they don’t get
- No veto over Tier 1 decisions
- Limited say in defense / foreign policy
This tier keeps countries like:
- Poland (depending on government)
- Czechia
- Romania
- Possibly Italy at times
They benefit economically but accept reduced blocking power.
Tier 3: The Associated / Peripheral Members
Includes
- Eurosceptic states
- Rule-of-law problematic states
- States unwilling to pool sovereignty
Features
- Market access (with conditions)
- Reduced funding
- No veto
- Opt-outs from core policies
Politically, this tier:
- Lowers internal sabotage
- Avoids forced exits
- Keeps the EU together without uniformity
3. How the Transition Actually Happens (Mechanism)
Phase 1: Crisis-Triggered Integration
A major external shock:
- Security escalation
- Energy crisis
- US withdrawal from NATO guarantees (partial or perceived)
→ Emergency coordination becomes permanent.
Phase 2: Enhanced Cooperation Becomes the Norm
What’s currently “exceptional” becomes routine:
- Joint procurement
- Joint debt for defense
- Standing EU military command (initially small)
Legal framing:
- No new constitution
- No referenda initially
- Everything done within existing treaties
Phase 3: Institutional Reality Catches Up
Once the system functions federally, institutions adapt:
- European Parliament sub-chambers for Tier 1
- A European Security Council
- Executive roles gain de facto authority
At this point, formal federalization becomes descriptive, not revolutionary.
4. The Main Challenges — and How They’re Tackled
Challenge 1: Democratic Legitimacy
Problem
- “Who voted for this?”
- Fear of technocratic overreach
Solution (gradual)
- Dual legitimacy:
- European Parliament (population)
- Council of States (state equality)
- Stronger national parliament oversight
- Eventually: elections tied to Tier 1 competencies only
Key insight:
Democracy is added after functionality, not before.
Challenge 2: National Identity & Cultural Fear
Problem
- Fear of erasure
- Centralization anxiety
Solution
- Explicit constitutional limits:
- Culture, language, education remain national
- Symbolic restraint:
- No forced EU patriotism
- No cultural homogenization narrative
Federalization is framed as instrumental, not civilizational.
Challenge 3: Economic Divergence
Problem
- Rich vs poorer states
- Transfer resentment
Solution
- Conditional solidarity:
- Funds tied to reforms
- Defense/industry investment rather than pure redistribution
- Core budget focused on public goods, not welfare
This keeps fiscal hawks on board.
Challenge 4: Spoilers & Internal Sabotage
Problem
- States using vetoes for leverage
- External influence
Solution
- Veto power slowly confined to Tier 2/3 issues
- Financial leverage replaces political confrontation
- Rule-of-law conditionality enforced quietly, not theatrically
The EU learns to stop arguing and start bypassing.
5. What This Looks Like After ~20 Years
- One EU passport, but multiple levels of political participation
- A real European military exists, but isn’t universal
- Foreign powers treat the Core as a single actor
- The word “federal” may still be avoided — but the structure is federal in practice
- Entry into the Core becomes a goal, not a right
Crucially:
The EU survives by accepting asymmetry, not by forcing unity.
Addressing lack of common mythos, corruption of the eastern states, and socio-ideological concerns ('wokeism', liberalism vs conservativism, etc.)
1. A Common European Mythos — Without Forcing It
First: what not to do
A common mythos cannot be:
- mandated from Brussels
- abstract (“values”, “norms”, “ever closer union”)
- culturally homogenizing
- framed as moral superiority
That approach backfires immediately and feeds Euroscepticism.
What does work: mythos by function + memory
The EU’s viable mythos is not “who we are”, but what we repeatedly choose to prevent and protect.
A plausible European mythos would be built around three pillars:
A. “Never Again, But Seriously This Time”
Not just WWII rhetoric, but:
- war between Europeans is unthinkable
- great-power subordination is unacceptable
- internal decay is as dangerous as external enemies
This mythos is defensive, sober, non-triumphalist.
B. Europe as a Civilizational Balancer
Not hegemonic, not missionary, but:
- resisting domination (whether Russian, American, or Chinese)
- preserving pluralism inside strength
- refusing ideological extremes
This is attractive even to skeptics because it avoids moral crusading.
C. Earned Membership, Not Moral Virtue
Belonging to the “core” is not about beliefs, but behavior and capacity:
- rule of law
- contribution to security
- institutional seriousness
That creates aspiration, not resentment.
Key mechanism:
Mythos spreads via institutions that work, not slogans.
A shared defense, crisis response, border protection, disaster relief — these quietly generate loyalty over time.
2. “Stamping Out” Corruption in the East — Without Colonial Dynamics
This is extremely sensitive, but unavoidable.
The core mistake to avoid
Framing corruption as:
- “Eastern backwardness”
- moral failure
- cultural deficiency
That narrative is both inaccurate and politically toxic.
The more accurate framing
Corruption is primarily a state-capacity and incentive problem, not a civilizational one.
Post-communist systems inherited:
- weak institutions
- politicized courts
- informal networks replacing trust
- sudden capital flows without enforcement capacity
How the EU can realistically reduce it
A. Shift from rule-policing to capacity-building
Instead of:
- endless “rule of law” scolding
- symbolic Article 7 threats
Move toward:
- embedding EU-level prosecutors, auditors, and judges in joint institutions
- EU oversight on specific funds, not entire states
- automatic mechanisms, not political discretion
This makes corruption technically harder, not morally condemned.
B. Conditional Core Access
This is where tiers matter.
Access to:
- defense industry contracts
- strategic funds
- decision-making roles
→ conditioned on:
- prosecutorial independence
- procurement transparency
- judicial enforceability
No lectures. Just incentives.
C. Make Corruption Economically Costly, Quietly
The EU historically failed by:
- tolerating corruption for stability
- then exploding politically when it becomes visible
Instead:
- silent fund suspension
- automatic clawbacks
- personal liability at elite levels
Corruption declines when it stops paying.
3. Reducing Over-Liberalism / “Wokeism” Without Reactionary Backlash
This is one of the least openly discussed but most decisive issues for EU legitimacy.
The problem
The EU increasingly appears as:
- culturally detached
- normatively maximalist
- focused on symbolic virtue rather than material order
This alienates:
- working classes
- conservatives
- much of Central/Eastern Europe
- even moderate liberals
What not to do
- Culture wars from Brussels
- Imposing social policy harmonization
- Framing dissent as moral failure
That creates permanent resistance.
What can work instead
A. Radical Institutional Neutrality on Culture
A federalizing EU must explicitly renounce cultural engineering.
That means:
- no EU-level identity politics
- no mandatory social ideology
- no symbolic legislation without functional purpose
This reassures skeptics immediately.
B. Recenter on Order, Capability, and Limits
The EU regains legitimacy by focusing on:
- borders
- infrastructure
- energy
- defense
- industrial resilience
When institutions deliver order, culture wars lose oxygen.
C. Subsidiarity With Teeth
Culture, family law, education → explicitly national
Not “in practice”, but constitutionally protected
This allows:
- liberal societies to remain liberal
- conservative societies to remain conservative
- cooperation without uniformity
Pluralism becomes structural, not rhetorical.
4. How These Three Threads Reinforce Each Other
Here’s the key insight:
Mythos, anti-corruption, and cultural restraint all depend on competence.
A Europe that:
- protects borders
- deters threats
- punishes corruption quietly
- avoids ideological overreach
…does not need forced narratives.
Legitimacy emerges after order and effectiveness.
5. The End State (If This Succeeds)
After ~20–30 years:
- A quiet European identity exists, but is not loudly proclaimed
- Corruption hasn’t vanished, but is structurally constrained
- Cultural battles happen nationally, not at EU level
- The EU is respected more than loved — and that’s enough
- Federalization is accepted because it works, not because it is “right”
In short:
Europe survives not by becoming more virtuous, but by becoming more serious.
Multiple tiers and waves, similar like this (while the exact list of members might differ)
More resources: https://www.youtube.com/@EUMadeSimple/featured
Anthem of the European Federation 
